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Abstract 
 
This paper updates a review conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1996 in which the 
agency evaluated the academic research on the effects of changes in after-tax wages on labor supply in 
the U.S. economy. That review concluded that substitution elasticities were larger in absolute value than 
income elasticities and that the decision to work was more responsive to after-tax wages than was the 
choice of hours. In this update, we find that for men and single women, estimates of substitution 
elasticities have increased, and income elasticities still appear to be smaller in absolute value than 
substitution elasticities. We also find that labor supply elasticities of married women have fallen 
substantially in the last three decades, although they are still higher than the elasticities of men and 
unmarried women. Based on our review, the elasticities of broad measures of income (total income less 
capital gains) from tax return data are in most instances consistent with the labor supply elasticities 
estimated using survey data. We find little compelling evidence that high-income taxpayers have 
substantially higher elasticities with respect to their labor input than other taxpayers: While some 
studies have estimated higher elasticities of broad income among high-income taxpayers, those results 
appear to reflect those taxpayers’ greater ability to time their income. In contrast, we find evidence that 
low-income workers have higher elasticities of labor supply than other workers, especially in the 
component of their labor response that reflects movement in and out of the workforce.  
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Introduction 
The extent to which workers respond to changes in their after-tax wages, and hence tax rates, 
can affect the supply of labor, total output, and other aspects of the economy. Workers can change the 
amount that they work in three ways: they can decide to work or not, they can adjust the number of 
hours they work, and they can alter the intensity of their work for a given number of hours at work. All 
of those responses affect labor supply in the economy. Changes in employment are also affected by 
employers’ decisions, but labor demand considerations are outside the scope of this paper.   
Many workers can respond to changing tax rates in other ways as well. They can adjust the 
forms in which they receive compensation—for example, by choosing to receive more or less of their 
compensation in untaxed fringe benefits or by shifting the payment of compensation from one year to 
another. Such responses can affect the wages workers receive in a given period but do not change the 
amount of labor input to the economy. Workers can also respond by adjusting how much income they 
report to the tax authorities. Those responses affect the amount of revenue collected but do not affect 
either labor supply or the forms of compensation. 
This paper reviews the academic research that attempts to identify the first set of responses—
the changes in labor supply that result from changes in tax rates. The paper updates a previous review 
conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 1996) more than 15 years ago.1 Because the true 
responses are unknown and estimates of the responses vary, that previous review presented ranges of 
estimates (see Table 1). The review found that in each population subgroup, the substitution elasticities 
were greater in absolute value than the income elasticities, and the decision to work showed greater 
                                                          
1 Although CBO has not previously published an update to its 1996 literature review, it did subsequently review the 
literature and adjusted its labor supply elasticity estimates to reflect that updated information.  See, for example, 
Congressional Budget Office, The Effect of Tax Changes on Labor Supply in CBO’s Microsimulation Model, 
Background Paper (April 2007), p. 6. 
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responsiveness than the choice of hours. The range of labor supply elasticities for married women was 
higher than, and did not overlap with, the range for men.  
More-recent research has extended the earlier studies in several ways. One is that newer 
studies capture changes in the economy since 1996, such as the higher attachment of married women 
to the labor force compared with that in earlier periods. Another is that many studies have shifted from 
measuring labor input using hours worked reported on surveys to using income reported on tax returns. 
A third development is that researchers have used the variation in marginal and average tax rates arising 
from expansions of the earned income tax credit (EITC) and significant changes in tax law in 1986 and 
1993 to isolate the effects of tax changes on labor supply.   
Adding information from the recent research literature to the studies reviewed in the previous 
CBO report, we developed new ranges of estimates of the responses of labor supply to changes in tax 
rates (see Table 2). We find that: 
• Among men and single women, substitution elasticities appear to have increased and now range 
from 0.1 to 0.3. Income elasticities still appear to be smaller in absolute value than substitution 
elasticities and remain in the range of -0.1 to zero.2  
• Labor supply elasticities of married women—historically much higher than the elasticities of 
men and unmarried women—have fallen substantially in the last three decades, although they 
are still higher than elasticities of men and unmarried women. The substitution elasticity of 
married women appears to range from 0.2 to 0.4, and their income elasticity appears to range 
from -0.1 to zero.  
                                                          
2 Both the review in 1996 and the current review assume that unmarried women and female heads of households 
have labor supply responses similar to men’s. Working-age single men and women typically must work to support 
themselves, so one would expect very low labor supply elasticities, especially regarding participation in the labor 
force. By comparison, married women have traditionally shown greater sensitivity of their labor supply to after-tax 
wages.  
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• Combining the elasticities for married women with those of men and single women yields 
substitution elasticities for the total population that range from 0.1 to 0.3, compared with a 
range of 0.2 to 0.4 in CBO’s previous review. Combining elasticities for those demographic 
groups yields income elasticities for the total population that range from -0.1 to zero, compared 
with a range of -0.2 to -0.1 in CBO’s previous review.  
• Some recent studies have estimated separate hours and participation elasticities. Some of those 
studies have examined specific subgroups, such as EITC-eligible workers, that may not be 
representative of all men or single women. Nevertheless, for men and single women, the range 
of elasticities for the choice of hours to work, conditional on working, appears to be -0.1 to 0.2, 
and the range of elasticities for whether to work appears to be zero to 0.1. Married women 
appear to be more responsive than single men and women along both the hours margin—with a 
range of elasticities from 0.1 to 0.3—and the participation margin—with a range of elasticities 
from zero to 0.3. 
• Estimates of the elasticity of broad income (total income less capital gains, generally as reported 
on tax returns) are within the range of zero to 0.3. These sorts of estimates have some 
advantages and disadvantages relative to the traditional labor supply literature for assessing the 
elasticity of labor supply: Although these estimates do not fully capture participation elasticities 
and include responses such as income shifting that are unrelated to labor supply, earnings and 
broad income are probably more accurately measured than hours worked and capture 
responses in work intensity. The range of those estimates does not vary far from the range of 
estimated elasticities from the traditional labor supply literature, perhaps in part because many 
low- and moderate-income taxpayers have only a limited opportunity to change their work 
intensity and thus their income. 
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• There is little compelling evidence that high-income taxpayers have substantially higher 
elasticities with respect to their labor input than lower-income taxpayers. Higher estimates of 
the elasticity of broad income among high-income taxpayers appear to reflect their greater 
ability to time their income rather than greater changes in their labor supply.  
• Low-income workers appear to have higher elasticities of labor supply than other workers. 
Among taxpayers eligible for the EITC, increases in after-tax income boosted labor force 
participation, particularly among single mothers, but had little effect on the choice of hours 
worked. Estimates of the participation elasticity for lower-income taxpayers eligible for the EITC 
range from 0.3 to 1.2, which are higher than estimates of participation elasticities for the total 
population.   
Measures of Changes in Labor Supply 
Total hours worked can change because people enter or leave employment or because existing 
workers change their hours. For that reason, many studies decompose the change in total hours worked 
into two separate decisions: the decision to work and the decision about how many hours to work. 
Some studies separately examine the substitution and income elasticities of hours worked and ignore 
the participation decision. 
The substitution effect measures the decline in effort when the return to work is lowered. The 
income effect measures the increase in effort when income declines—including when the return to 
work is lowered, because it then takes more hours of work to receive the same after-tax income. 
Because substitution and income effects generally work in opposite directions when tax rates change, 
their relative magnitude will determine whether hours worked increase or decrease.  
It is frequently useful to measure a change in total hours worked relative to the existing number 
of hours. For that purpose, economists use elasticities, which describe changes in percentage terms: 
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• The participation elasticity is the percentage change in the share of the population that is 
working resulting from a 1 percent change in after-tax wage rates.  
• The hours elasticity is the percentage change in the hours worked resulting from a 1 percent 
change in after-tax wage rates, among people already working.  
• The substitution elasticity is the percentage change in hours worked resulting from a 1 
percent change in the after-tax marginal wage rate, holding the well-being of the individual 
constant. 
• The income elasticity is the percentage change in hours worked resulting from a 1 percent 
change in total after-tax income, holding the after-tax marginal wage rate constant.  
The income and substitution elasticities cannot be readily aggregated because different changes 
in tax policy that have similar effects on the after-tax marginal wage rate (and thus similar substitution 
effects) can have very different effects on total after-tax income (and thus very different income 
effects). For example, increasing the standard deduction would have no effect on the after-tax marginal 
wage rate for any taxpayer taking the standard deduction but would increase incomes differently for 
those filing joint returns and those filing single returns. As another example, the income effect from 
changing the tax on capital gains would affect taxpayers in proportion to their capital gains. Thus, the 
total wage elasticity equals the sum of the income and substitution elasticities only for changes in taxes 
that are proportionate at every level of income and for every source of income.3 
Elasticities also depend on workers’ perceptions of the financial return to working and other 
factors that can change over time. If workers do not accurately perceive their after-tax marginal wage 
rates, changes in those rates will probably have less effect on their labor supply. That point implies that 
                                                          
3 Researchers have examined the response of labor supply to the net-of-tax rate (1 minus the marginal tax rate) 
and to the after-tax wage rate (the hourly wage times the net-of-tax rate). These elasticities differ in a progressive 
tax system because a change in the marginal tax rate alters only taxpayer income covered by that tax rate, while a 
change in the wage alters total income by that same percentage. If income effects are small, however, the two 
elasticities should be similar because the substitution elasticities are the same in both cases. 
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a worker’s labor supply is probably less elastic in the short run than in the long run, because workers 
probably learn about changes in after-tax marginal wage rates over time. It also implies that a worker’s 
labor supply is probably less elastic in response to subtle policy changes than to salient policy changes. 
 Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Studies 
The studies discussed in CBO’s 1996 review and in this paper analyze microeconomic data, 
primarily survey information or tax data gathered from working-age men and women. Other studies—
including Prescott (2003), Davis and Henrekson (2005), and Prescott (2006)—rely on macroeconomic 
data and typically estimate total elasticities of labor supply near 1, which is substantially larger than the 
elasticities appearing in studies based on microeconomic data.  
There are several explanations for the relatively high elasticities in macroeconomic studies.4 
First, macroeconomic studies generally include workers’ shifting their labor input from one period to 
another in response to temporary changes in the after-tax wage rate (the intertemporal substitution of 
labor), rather than focusing on the permanent change in labor input resulting from permanent changes 
in the after-tax wage rate.5 Second, some macroeconomic studies may implicitly include the effects of 
contemporaneous changes in social insurance programs that lower the cost to workers of being 
unemployed. Third, macroeconomic studies sometimes look at tax changes that include lump sum 
redistributions, which reduce or eliminate the income effect. And fourth, macroeconomic studies often 
rely on assumptions about people’s preferences that tend to boost estimated elasticities. 
                                                          
4 See Davis and Henrekson (2005) for a discussion. 
5 The Frisch elasticity captures people’s willingness to trade off work and consumption over time. For a separate 
review of research studies that estimate Frisch elasticities, see Felix Reichling and Charles Whalen, Review of 
Estimates of the Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply, Congressional Budget Office Working Paper 2012-13 (October 
2012). 
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Sources of Data on Labor Supply 
Research published since CBO’s 1996 review has utilized new sources of data. While many of the 
newer studies of labor supply continue to use survey data, a related literature has developed using tax 
return data to estimate the elasticity of income with respect to changes in tax rates. While elasticity 
estimates based on tax return data are not directly comparable to estimates from the traditional labor 
supply literature, they are useful benchmarks for the elasticities found in that literature.  
Survey Data 
The traditional approach to estimating labor supply elasticities uses information from household 
surveys to examine changes in the number of hours worked or employment rates resulting from 
changes in after-tax wage rates. An advantage of such surveys is the availability of data on both labor 
income and labor supply, as well as the characteristics of the workers. However, studies taking this 
traditional approach encounter a number of challenges due to the nature of survey data.  
Some surveys ask respondents about their usual hourly wage rate, but when it is not available, 
studies generally compute wages rates from annual earnings divided by the annual number of hours 
worked. (Surveys typically ask respondents about the hours worked in the last year and annual 
earnings.) Because the figure for annual hours worked is often measured with error and appears in the 
statistical model as both the dependent variable and in the denominator of the key independent 
variable of wage rates, there is a spurious negative correlation between hours and wage rates. As a 
result of that denominator or division bias, one would expect that the estimated coefficient on wages is 
biased downwards; indeed, Keane (2011) finds that studies that use direct measures of wages generally 
produce higher elasticity estimates than those that compute hourly wages from annual earnings divided 
by hours.  
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Studies also vary in how they measure non-labor income, often because of limitations in data 
availability. Non-labor income and total wages and salary may be jointly determined (for example, by 
the division of total compensation into salary and stock options), which is resolved in some studies 
through various statistical methods. In addition, simple static models that do not consider long-term 
changes often measure non-labor income using current asset income, but assets at a point in time may 
not accurately reflect lifetime wealth, which matters for the income effect. Researchers have tried to 
address this problem by adjusting non-labor income to account for life-cycle effects.  
Tax Return Data 
 Studies that use tax return data to estimate the elasticity of income with respect to the net-of-
tax rate provide additional information about the elasticity of labor supply. This literature focuses on the 
elasticity of income to estimate the responsiveness of tax revenues to changes in tax rates. Estimates 
from this literature—reviewed by Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012)—have both advantages and 
disadvantages relative to estimates from the traditional literature on labor supply elasticities. 
A primary advantage of the tax return literature is its use of income data from tax returns. 
Incomes, especially for income sources subject to third-party reporting such as wages, are more 
accurately measured than hours worked reported in surveys. Moreover, changes in income capture 
changes in the intensity of work and changes in career paths, both of which typically are absent from 
traditional studies of labor supply. In addition, some researchers have access to panels of tax return 
data, which allows them to estimate elasticities over long enough periods of time to distinguish short-
term effects and long-term effects.   
However, a key disadvantage of the tax return literature is that reported income can change for 
reasons unrelated to labor supply, such as changes in the type of compensation, changes in the timing of 
compensation, changes in tax avoidance, and changes in tax evasion. As a result of evasion, some 
sources of income that are not easily verifiable, such as self-employment income, are more prone to 
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reporting error than wages, which are independently reported to the Internal Revenue Service by 
employers. The definition of income used also affects how closely changes in income reflect changes in 
labor supply. Many studies estimate the elasticity of taxable income excluding capital gains from the 
measure of taxable income. By excluding capital gains, the researchers eliminate a highly variable source 
of income that probably has little relationship to labor supply decisions. However, taxable income 
changes when deductions change, and taxpayers can adjust their itemized deductions to alter their 
taxable income much more easily than they can change the number of hours they work or switch jobs. 
Thus, the elasticity of taxable income is likely to be higher than the elasticity of labor supply because of 
the additional responses reflected in taxable income. 
Fortunately, some studies also include a broader income measure—total income (rather than 
taxable income) less capital gains.6 Unlike taxable income, total income does not reflect deductions or 
exemptions. Since total income cannot be changed by altering deductions, estimates of its elasticity with 
respect to changes in tax rates are generally lower than those of taxable income. Because wages and 
salaries are the largest component of total income for most taxpayers, we consider elasticities of total, 
or broad, income for this review. However, there are segments of the population for whom those 
elasticities probably incorporate types of behavioral changes other than those affecting labor supply. In 
particular, earned income is a relatively small share of total income for high-income individuals, so their 
elasticity of broad income probably reflects some behavior unrelated to labor supply.  
Elasticity estimates based on tax return data have other limitations for measuring labor supply 
effects. First, the use of tax return data means that the participation decision is not measured separately 
and in some cases is not measured at all. For single filers, the estimates of the elasticity of broad income 
generally reflect decisions only about how many hours to work because individuals who are outside the 
                                                          
6 Chetty (2011) suggests that wage income might be useful in the same way. However, most published elasticity 
estimates using tax return data are based on broad income, not wage income.    
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workforce generally do not file tax returns and therefore are not included in the analyses. For married 
couples filing jointly, the estimates of the elasticity include decisions on whether or not to work as well 
as how many hours to work because the broad income of the tax unit (and not the broad income of each 
spouse) is the focus of the analysis. However, researchers studying a decrease in tax rates, say, generally 
do not distinguish between an increase in hours worked by the spouse who is initially in the labor force 
and a decision to enter the workforce by the other spouse. It would be possible to see if one or both 
spouses worked using information from Forms W-2 (the information return used by employers to report 
wage income to taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service) or Schedules SE (the schedules used by 
taxpayers to determine their self-employment income tax liability), but most researchers do not have 
access to those data. A further limitation of elasticity estimates from tax return data is that, because of 
limited demographic information on tax returns, the estimates from this literature do not distinguish 
between elasticities of men and women. Finally, the tax return literature typically does not estimate 
substitution and income elasticities separately. In some studies, income elasticities are assumed to be 
zero, while in others no mention is made of the distinction between substitution and income elasticities. 
Changes in the Labor Market Reflected in Recent Studies  
Changes in public policies and in the demographic characteristics of the labor force have had a 
substantial impact on the labor market in recent decades. Among the most important of these changes 
have been the expansion in earnings subsidies provided through the tax system and the increase in the 
role of married women in the labor force. Although these trends started decades ago, lags in the 
availability of data mean that the studies included in CBO’s 1996 review did not reflect the trends as well 
as more-recent studies have.   
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Expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
The EITC was originally enacted in 1975, but substantial expansions in eligibility and increases in 
the credit amount occurred in subsequent years. The total cost for the EITC increased from $1.3 billion 
in 1975 to $59.6 billion in 2010. The EITC reduces tax liability on the basis of a taxpayer’s earnings (or 
adjusted gross income, if that is larger, in the credit’s phaseout range) and number of children. The 
credit is refundable; in other words, if it exceeds the taxpayer’s income tax liability before that credit, 
then the excess is paid as a refund. The main features of the EITC—the rate at which it phases in and 
out, the maximum amount of the credit, and the income thresholds for the phase-in and phaseout—
depend on the number of children in the taxpayer’s household. 
Several studies have used the 1994-1996 expansion of the EITC to estimate labor supply 
elasticities for lower-income workers. That expansion increased the maximum credit for taxpayers with 
children and created a credit for childless taxpayers. In addition, the expansion boosted the credit for 
taxpayers with two or more children by more than that for taxpayers with one child.7   
The EITC can dramatically alter marginal tax rates for taxpayers who claim it, especially 
taxpayers with children. For individuals with income in the credit’s phase-in range, the EITC reduces 
marginal rates by between 7.65 and 40 percentage points below the statutory tax bracket rates, usually 
to negative levels. Throughout the plateau—the income range between the two thresholds where 
taxpayers receive the maximum credit—the EITC has no effect on marginal tax rates. In the phaseout 
range, the EITC adds between 7.65 and 21.06 percentage points to taxpayers’ marginal rates. 
Increase in the Role of Married Women in the Labor Force 
 Changes in the characteristics and labor force attachment of married women may have affected 
their labor supply elasticities. First, the share of women who are married has declined over time. 
                                                          
7 For historic EITC parameters, see Tax Policy Center, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/ 
displayafact.cfm?Docid=36. 
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Because married women’s labor supply is generally more elastic, this change has probably caused 
women’s overall labor supply elasticity to decrease over time. Second, the average age of married 
women has increased over time owing to lower birth rates and the aging of the baby-boom cohort. If 
elasticities vary by age, that aging of the population of married women might have changed the average 
elasticity of married women’s labor supply. Third, fertility rates have fallen over time, and because 
women with young children have traditionally had lower labor force participation rates than other 
groups, the decline in fertility rates has probably pushed up women’s labor force participation. With 
greater participation, the number of individuals who could choose to go to work if tax rates fell is 
smaller, probably reducing the elasticity of labor force participation in response to reductions in tax 
rates. Finally, women’s average educational attainment has increased, as has their participation in 
professional fields. This change may also affect their elasticity of labor supply.  
Results from the Recent Literature 
This section updates the ranges of elasticities of labor supply reported in CBO’s 1996 review by 
including estimates published since that time. Our update has the following characteristics: 
• Recognizing the uncertainty about the true elasticities, we again present ranges of elasticities 
rather than point estimates. 
• We rely primarily on articles published in academic journals (and literature reviews of those 
articles) because their results have been peer-reviewed, although we also include working 
papers that have been become sufficiently well accepted in the economics profession to appear 
in literature reviews.  
• We focus on studies of the U.S. economy (as did the 1996 review). Labor supply elasticities may 
differ in other countries because of institutional differences in their labor markets or social 
insurance programs. 
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• When appropriate, we decompose results for hours or participation elasticities into results for 
substitution and income elasticities, and vice versa. 
• Because estimates of the elasticity of broad income include responses other than labor supply 
and cannot be separated out into component elasticities, we do not use estimates from the tax 
return literature directly to update the ranges of labor supply elasticities. Instead, we separately 
consider the range of broad income elasticities to confirm the range of estimated elasticities 
from the traditional labor supply literature. 
• We consider income and substitution elasticities from static models (specifically, Hicksian and 
Marshallian elasticities), as did the 1996 paper. Estimates of Frisch elasticities, which are used in 
dynamic models and hold the marginal utility of wealth constant across periods and reflect labor 
supply responses over the life cycle, are outside the scope of this review.8  
Elasticities for Men and Single Women  
In assessing the responsiveness of labor supply to changes in taxes, we pool men and single 
women. We do this in part because labor force participation rates of men and single women (with the 
exception of low-income single women with children who are the focus of the EITC studies discussed 
below) are generally high, in contrast with labor force participation rates of married women, which are 
generally lower. We also do this because researchers typically assume that the labor supply decision of a 
married woman is affected by the labor supply decision of her spouse but that labor supply decisions of 
men and single women are made independently. 
Income Elasticity. Estimates from the literature show that income elasticities for men and single 
women are small (see Table 3, Panel A). Some recent estimates of income elasticities are based on 
random variation in non-labor income resulting from lotteries. For example, Imbens, Rubin, and 
                                                          
8 See Felix Reichling and Charles Whalen, Review of Estimates of the Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply. 
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Sacerdote (2001) use data on lottery winnings and estimate income elasticities of wage income between 
-0.05 and -0.11, and Jacob and Ludwig (2012) use a randomized lottery for housing vouchers and 
estimate an income elasticity of hours worked by members of lower-income households who apply for 
housing assistance of -0.09. Using recent survey data, Bishop, Heim, and Mihaly (2009) and Heim 
(2009a) find income elasticities close to zero for single women and married men. For working-age men, 
Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) also estimate an income elasticity near zero. The results of those studies are 
consistent with the range of estimated income elasticities between -0.1 and zero found in the earlier 
CBO review. 
Substitution Elasticity. In a recent survey of the literature on labor supply elasticities for men, 
Keane (2011) cites only one study using a static model—Eklöf and Sacklén (2000)—that has been 
published since CBO’s 1996 review (see Table 3, Panel B). Using a direct wage measure and examining 
the impact of alternative sample restrictions and variable definitions, Eklöf and Sacklén estimate the 
substitution elasticity to be 0.27 following the methods used by Hausman (1981). Heim (2009a) 
estimates the substitution elasticity for married men to be in the range of 0.04 to 0.07. Other recent 
studies (Bishop, Heim, and Mihaly, 2009, and Jacob and Ludwig, 2012) estimate elasticities to be about 
0.2. Considering all of the evidence, we conclude that the range encompassing most estimates extends 
from 0.1 to 0.3 (a range with a higher upper end than that of the 0.1 to 0.2 range reported in CBO’s 1996 
review).  
Elasticities of Participation and Hours Worked. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999) estimate an hours 
elasticity of 0.13 for married men ages 21 to 61 (see Table 3, Panel C). In a later study (2005) that uses 
more years of data, they estimate an elasticity of -0.47. Unlike many of the other studies included in this 
review, these studies make strong assumptions about preferences and life-cycle effects. They also 
include different control variables than most other papers. The unusually large and negative estimated 
elasticity could be the result of those differences.   
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Chetty (2012) finds an average participation elasticity of 0.25 (see Table 3, Panel D). This 
estimate includes participation elasticities of married women and single mothers who are the target of 
EITC expansions and welfare reform; elasticities of that group tend to be higher than those of the 
general population of men and single women. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) estimate participation 
elasticities between 0.05 and 0.29 for men stratified by income group, with a population-weighted 
average of 0.13. Bishop, Heim, and Mihaly (2009) find that the hours and participation elasticities for 
single women fell between 1979 and 2003. Over the period 1996 through 2003, the estimated hours 
elasticities varied from about 0.10 to -0.03, and the estimated participation elasticities varied from 
about 0.1 to 0.2. The hours elasticities are within the range reported in other studies for men, while the 
participation elasticities are slightly higher. For married men, Heim (2009a) finds no response of 
participation and elasticities ranging from 0.04 to 0.07 for hours.  
In the prior subsections, we extended the upper bound on substitution elasticities from 0.2 in 
the 1996 review to 0.3 in order to incorporate a new estimate but did not changed the range of income 
elasticities from the 1996 review. That extension of the range of substitution elasticities would be 
reflected in either higher hours elasticities or higher participation elasticities. However, labor force 
participation rates for this population are already high, leaving little room for an increase, and most men 
and single women have little ability to cease working while maintaining a satisfactory income. 
Consequently, we assume that the increase in the total reflects an increase in the hours elasticity. We 
therefore raise the upper bound on the hours elasticity by 0.1 relative to CBO’s 1996 review, producing 
a range for the hours elasticity of -0.1 to 0.2. The recent literature estimates participation elasticities 
ranging from zero to 0.1 for men (for example, see Heim 2009a and Juhn, Murphy, and Topel 2002). 
Although one paper reports an estimated elasticity for single women that is higher (Bishop, Heim, and 
Mihaly 2009), the difference is not enough to justify changing the combined elasticity for men and single 
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women. We therefore conclude that the range of zero to 0.1 from CBO’s 1996 review still summarizes 
the literature about the participation elasticity. 
Elasticities for Married Women  
The growth in women’s labor force participation in recent decades has motivated a number of 
papers examining the labor supply elasticities for married women. Heim (2007) presents convincing 
evidence that changes in women’s age profile and education levels are responsible for declines in their 
labor supply elasticities between 1979 and 2003, but the magnitudes of the declines are not clear.9 Blau 
and Kahn (2007) find similar declines in labor supply elasticities using cross-sectional wage variation in 
three periods between 1979 and 2001, although their point estimates of the elasticities differ from 
Heim’s estimates.  
Income Elasticity. Research shows that income elasticities of married women are small in 
magnitude. Blau and Kahn (2007) and Heim (2007) find income elasticities of about -0.1 (see Table 4, 
Panel A). Jacob and Ludwig (2012) include married women in their sample; their estimates of -0.09 are 
consistent with the elasticities estimated using survey data restricted to married women. Thus, the 
recent literature suggests income elasticities of -0.1 for this group.10 However, because married 
women’s labor supply elasticities are declining and therefore becoming more similar to those of men 
and single women, we assume the range of income elasticities for married women matches that 
discussed above for men and single women—namely, -0.1 to zero.     
                                                          
9 Heim’s estimates are derived from regression analysis on point elasticities estimated for each year using a 
combination of instrumental variables and sample selection models. The precision of the estimated point 
elasticities depends on the strength of the instruments, and the high year-to-year variation in the elasticities may 
arise because the instruments used are not very strong. It is not clear that using regression analysis on those points 
is an appropriate procedure for increasing the precision of the estimates. 
10 Kumar (2012) estimates income elasticities for married women between -0.4 and -0.6 using 1986 tax reforms for 
identification. As demonstrated in Heim (2007), married women’s labor supply elasticities have sharply declined 
since that time. Thus, those estimates are not included in our range of elasticities for married women.  
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Substitution Elasticity. Blau and Kahn (2007) estimate that the total elasticity of hours worked 
by married women with respect to after-tax wages fell from 0.7 between 1979 and 1981 to 0.3 or 0.4 
between 1999 and 2001 (see Table 4, Panel B).11 Heim (2007) also finds a sharp decline in the 
substitution elasticity and estimates a value of about 0.2, representing an hours response of 0.14 and a 
participation response of 0.03. Using an estimation approach that assumes a quadratic utility function, 
Heim (2009a) finds substitution elasticities of about 0.3. Thus, based on the recent literature, 
substitution elasticities appear to range from 0.2 to 0.4. 
Elasticities of Participation and Hours Worked. For married women, Heim (2009a) estimates 
that the elasticity of hours worked with respect to wages is between 0.2 and 0.3 and that the elasticity 
of participation with respect to wages is 0.1 and 0.2 (see Table 4, Panels C and D). Although the study 
specifies the utility function of workers, it finds a range of elasticities that is not very different from 
those found in other studies. Heim (2007) also distinguishes between income and substitution 
elasticities for both the hours and participation responses. For hours worked, he estimates that 
substitution elasticities decreased from 0.36 to 0.14 and income elasticities fell from -0.05 to -0.02 
between 1978 and 2002 (elasticities from 1978 are not shown in the table); for participation, over this 
time period income elasticities fell from -0.13 to -0.05, while substitution elasticities fell from 0.66 to 
0.03.12 If substitution effects dominate income effects, as suggested by significant amounts of other 
research, the hours and participation elasticities should be somewhat close to the substitution 
components of those elasticities. The hours elasticity would then be 0.1, and the participation elasticity 
would be zero, and those values form our lower bounds. While we find no evidence that would lead to 
                                                          
11 Studies of women’s labor supply differ on how education and fertility are modeled. If women who prefer fewer 
children also tend to earn higher wages and have a higher labor supply, then omitting the number of children as an 
explanatory variable can result in a spurious positive correlation between wages and labor supply. If, however, 
fertility is influenced by wages (for example, if higher wages induce women to work more and have fewer 
children), then controlling for the number of children will understate the total effect of wages on labor supply. 
12 Because Heim does not report the ratio of labor income to nonlabor income, we cannot calculate the 
corresponding participation and hours elasticities. 
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changes in the upper bounds on hours elasticities, Blau and Kahn (2007) effectively demonstrate that 
the upper bound on the participation elasticity has fallen to 0.3. Therefore, our ranges for hours and 
participation elasticities for married women are 0.1 to 0.3 and zero to 0.3, respectively.  
Elasticity of Broad Income  
The range of estimates of the elasticity of broad income is similar to the range of estimates of 
the elasticity of labor supply from the traditional labor supply literature. As discussed above, the 
elasticity of broad income has some advantages and disadvantages relative to the elasticity of hours 
worked as a measure of the responsiveness of labor supply. However, we interpret the similarity of the 
ranges of estimates as supporting the ranges we identified in the previous sections of this review. 
Income Elasticity. In this literature, the income elasticity is generally assumed to be zero (for 
example, see Saez, 2004, and Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2012). A few studies that distinguish income 
elasticities (for example, see Kopczuk, 2005, and Gruber and Saez, 2002) estimate that the income 
elasticity is small and insignificantly different from zero. Using Social Security earnings records matched 
to survey data for lottery participants, Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001) estimate income elasticities 
ranging from -0.05 to -0.11, which is still quite small. Therefore, we interpret estimates of the elasticity 
of broad income as substitution elasticities. 
Substitution Elasticity. Broad income elasticities estimated using tax returns generally range 
between zero and 0.3 (see Table 5). Gruber and Saez (2002) estimate that the elasticity of broad income 
with respect to the net-of-tax rate is between 0.07 and 0.12 using three-year changes over the period 
1979 through 1990, while Giertz (2007) estimates that this elasticity is between 0.15 and 0.23 using a 
different dataset and including an additional decade—marked by significant changes in tax law—of data. 
Additional studies using data spanning fewer years find similar elasticities—0.1 (Saez, 2003) and 0.2 
(Heim, 2009b). Two studies, Kopczuk (2005) and Giertz (2010), form both the lower and upper bounds of 
the range we identify. Both studies find a lower bound of about zero, with Giertz’s estimate reflecting 
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the short-term response of hours to a permanent change in tax rates, and both find an upper bound of 
about 0.3. This range encompasses the range of substitution elasticities found in the traditional labor 
supply literature for men and single women and is on the lower end of that range for married women. 
Elasticities can depend on the length of time over which the response is measured. On one 
hand, as noted above, workers may be better able to change their work hours or labor force 
participation over a longer period of time. On the other hand, changes in the timing of income can result 
in a higher responsiveness of taxable income to changes in net-of-tax rates over short periods of time. 
Estimates outside the range from zero to 0.3 that we identify appear to be attributable to income timing 
by high-income taxpayers (see Goolsbee, 2000) or to short-term income shifting around a major tax 
change (see Auten and Carroll, 1999).13 
Role of Frictions. Chetty (2012) reconciles the wide range of estimated substitution elasticities 
by introducing a role for frictions. He argues that the observed response to tax changes can differ from 
the true substitution elasticity because of frictions in the labor market; those frictions can be thought of 
as adjustment costs or price misperceptions. Chetty derives bounds on a true elasticity using the tax 
change, the observed elasticity, and an exogenously determined magnitude of frictions (expressed as 
the percentage of earnings lost from not working the optimal number of hours). When there are 
multiple observed estimates of an elasticity, a point estimate of the true elasticity can be derived by 
finding the minimum amount of frictions that generates bounds consistent with the observed estimates.  
In his meta-analysis pooling five studies using hours data and ten studies using tax return data, 
Chetty calculates a long-run true substitution elasticity for hours worked by people in the labor force 
                                                          
13 Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) point out that using only two years of data when tax-rate changes are 
concentrated in one portion of the income distribution can lead to unconvincing results. Auten and Carroll (1999) 
show that using two years of data can lead to estimates that are very sensitive to specification choices. 
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with respect to net-of-tax rates of 0.33 (see Table 5).14 Although income should be more sensitive to 
taxes than are hours worked, for the reasons discussed above, the average elasticity of income and the 
average elasticity of hours are both 0.15 among the studies analyzed by Chetty.15 
The studies used by Chetty to bound the elasticity for hours worked by people in the labor force 
examine responses to tax changes in the United States, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Iceland, and 
Denmark. The size of the tax changes studied varied greatly among the five countries, with Iceland and 
Sweden experiencing substantially larger rate changes than the other three countries. Because the costs 
of adjusting labor supply are probably smaller relative to the potential gains (that is, the frictions are 
probably less important) in the countries with the larger rate changes, Chetty asserts that the observed 
elasticities for Iceland and Sweden are closer to the true elasticity. However, institutional differences in 
tax systems and labor markets in these countries may also lead to higher elasticities. For example, 
because health insurance in Sweden is not tied to full-time employment, the average number of hours 
worked may be more sensitive to changes in after-tax wage rates. If we consider only the studies used 
by Chetty that examine responses to tax changes in the United States, the derived true elasticity for 
hours worked by people in the labor force drops sharply from 0.33 to 0.08, while the average elasticity 
of hours falls slightly from 0.15 to 0.12. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that labor market 
frictions mean that estimated elasticities of labor supply are biased downward to some extent. The 
range of elasticities in the long run is therefore likely to exceed the range of elasticities that has been 
estimated for the U.S. economy.  
 
                                                          
14 Chetty (2012) and Chetty et al. (2012) also examine the possible role of frictions in estimates of the participation 
elasticity in the traditional labor supply literature. They conclude that frictions would have to be implausibly large 
to explain the differences among those estimates, so those differences probably reflect differences in the true 
elasticities of the groups being studied.       
15 The estimates of taxable income elasticities used by Chetty (2012) also include studies using earned income.   
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Elasticities by Income Group 
 Labor supply elasticities may differ by income group (see Juhn, Murphy, and Topel, 2002, and 
Ziliak and Kniesner, 1999). If, for example, lower-income people have lower labor force participation 
rates, then their participation response to reductions in tax rates could be higher because there are 
more people who could enter the workforce. And if elasticities vary by income, then tax policies that 
target lower-income taxpayers may produce different labor supply responses than policies that target 
higher-income taxpayers. Therefore, it is inappropriate to use the ranges of elasticities presented in 
Table 2 as estimates for the changes in labor supply that would result from all potential changes in tax 
policies.  
High-Income Individuals. Several studies use tax-return data to examine the elasticity of broad 
income among high-income taxpayers. Compared to survey data, the tax data used in these studies 
oversample high-income taxpayers, so sample sizes are larger. Relative to other taxpayers, high-income 
taxpayers typically have more non-wage and salary income and more opportunities to reduce taxation 
by shifting income from year to year or from taxed sources to untaxed (or more lightly taxed) sources. 
Therefore, the responsiveness of broad income is probably less reflective of the labor supply response 
for high-income individuals than for other individuals, and in particular the estimated elasticity of broad 
income for high-income individuals probably exceeds their labor supply elasticity.  
For example, Saez (2004) notes that although the elasticity of broad income among all taxpayers 
is 0.2, the elasticity varies across income groups (see Table 6, Panel A). Among the top 1 percent of 
taxpayers, a 1 percentage-point increase in the net-of-tax rate increases broad income by 0.5 
percentage points, but among the bottom 99 percent of taxpayers, a similar increase in the net-of-tax 
rate has a very small (and imprecisely estimated) effect on broad income. Heim (2009b) finds an even 
greater elasticity of 0.7 to 0.9 for taxpayers with incomes above $500,000 in the base year, while his 
estimates of elasticities for other taxpayers are close to zero and imprecisely estimated.   
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There have been several attempts to abstract from other sorts of responses by high-income 
taxpayers in order to focus on their labor supply responses. Showalter and Thurston (1997) use survey 
data of self-employed physicians to estimate the elasticity of physicians’ hours; their estimated elasticity 
of 0.33 is higher than many estimates for other groups. Goolsbee (2000) uses the Execucomp database 
to examine the taxable income elasticities of executives. While estimated short-run elasticities (which 
incorporate income shifting) exceed 1, estimated longer-run elasticities vary from -0.17 to 0.40. The 
estimated short-run elasticities for executives with incomes over $1 million exceed 2, mostly due to 
shifts in the timing of compensation and especially the choice of when to exercise stock options, and 
executives with incomes between $275,000 and $500,000 have short-run elasticities less than 0.4. The 
estimated long-run elasticities show a similar pattern across income levels: 0.55 for executives with 
incomes over $1 million and 0.34 for those with incomes between $275,000 and $500,000. 
Furthermore, the estimated short-run and long-run elasticities for salary and bonuses are relatively low: 
0.15 and 0.09, respectively. In sum, with the exception of executives with incomes in excess of 
$1 million, the elasticities of executives’ labor supply and wage income are barely outside the ranges of 
elasticities presented in Table 2.    
Low-Income Individuals. Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) estimate participation elasticities for 
men at different points in the wage distribution using cross-sections of the Current Population Survey. 
They find that participation elasticities are largest at the lower end of the distribution—for example, the 
estimated participation elasticity for workers in the bottom 10 percent of the wage distribution is more 
than twice as large as that for workers near the middle of the distribution. 
A number of studies have used the variation in after-tax wage rates created by the expansion of 
the EITC to estimate the labor supply response among low-income workers. Eissa and Hoynes (2006) 
review the research on the effect of the EITC on labor supply. They find that studies consistently show a 
statistically significant link between expansions of the EITC and increases in labor force participation 
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among single mothers. However, those studies have not found evidence that those expansions cause 
people already in the work force to change the number of hours they worked. The consistency of those 
findings is notable, occurring across studies using different policy changes, control groups, and 
methodologies. 
There are a few possible explanations for the lack of a statistically significant effect of changes in 
the EITC on how many hours people work. The first possible explanation is that the true effect is weak. 
Indeed, a number of studies find that the labor supply elasticity of working women is lower than the 
elasticity of all women (for example, see Mroz, 1987, and Triest, 1990). Another possible explanation is 
that the estimates are imprecise. Many of the studies use quasi-experimental or semi-parametric 
approaches that, because they impose fewer restrictions on the form of the relationship between after-
tax wages and hours worked, generally result in less precise estimates than parametric approaches; also, 
the variable of interest—hours worked—is imprecisely measured. A final possible explanation is that, 
while the EITC as a refundable tax credit for low-income workers is well-publicized, the marginal tax 
rates associated with the phase-in and phaseout ranges are probably less well known and are obscured 
by interactions with other tax provisions. If EITC recipients do not recognize the incentives created by 
changes in the EITC, then they would not change their labor supply in response. Recent work by Chetty, 
Friedman, and Saez (2012) using tax return data suggests that almost all of the labor supply response to 
the EITC comes from workers in the phase-in region. In contrast to most of the previous literature, they 
find that the most of the increase in EITC refunds is due to increases in wages among individuals who are 
already working; the estimated elasticity of participation is smaller than the estimated elasticity of hours 
worked.  
On the participation margin for low-income individuals, Hotz and Scholz (2003) find elasticities 
with respect to after-tax income ranging from 0.69 to 1.16 in their review of the literature (see Table 6, 
Panel B). Using variation in wages from expansions of the EITC and means-tested transfers, Meyer and 
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Rosenbaum (2001) estimate that, for single mothers, the elasticity of working during the year with 
respect to after-tax wages is 0.4. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) use data from 1984 to 2006 to examine the 
effect of the EITC on participation rates for married couples with children. The authors estimate that the 
total elasticity of participation by married women with respect to after-tax wages is 0.27, while the 
participation elasticity for husbands is only 0.03. The authors also estimate that a $1,000 increase in net 
unearned income reduces the participation of wives by 0.1 percentage points and of husbands by 
0.5 percentage points, implying income elasticities of -0.04 and -0.01, respectively. 
Estimates of the elasticity of participation from the EITC literature are generally higher than 
those estimated for groups not eligible for the EITC, which is consistent with the higher estimated 
elasticities found by Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002). For comparison, Blau and Kahn (2007) estimate 
participation elasticities with respect to wages ranging from 0.27 to 0.30 among married women. The 
higher elasticities found in the EITC literature may reflect the lower initial labor force participation of 
lower-income single women with children, the focus of a number of EITC studies.    
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Table 1.  
Summary of Labor Supply Elasticities from CBO’s 1996 Review 
         Broken Down into Broken Down into 
 
Total 
Wage Income Substitution Average-Hours Participation 
 
Elasticity Elasticity  Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity 
Men -0.1 to 0.2 -0.1 to 0 0.1 to 0.2 -0.1 to 0.1 0 to 0.1 
Married Women 0.3 to 0.7 -0.3 to -0.2 0.6 to 0.9 0.1 to 0.3  0.2 to 0.4 
All People 0 to 0.3 -0.2 to -0.1 0.2 to 0.4 -0.1 to 0.1 0.1 to 0.2 
 
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office. 1996. “Labor Supply and Taxes.” CBO 
Memorandum, www.cbo.gov/publication/13598. 
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Table 2.  
Updated Ranges of Labor Supply Elasticities 
  
     Panel A. Income and Substitution Elasticities 
 
  
 
  Income Substitution 
 
 
Men and Single Women -0.1 to 0 0.1 to 0.3 
 
 
Married Women -0.1 to 0 0.2 to 0.4 
 
 
Total Population -0.1 to 0 0.1 to 0.3 
 
     Panel B. Hours and Participation Elasticities 
  
     
 
  Hours  Participation 
 
Men and Single Women -0.1 to 0.2 0 to 0.1 
 
Married Women 0.1 to 0.3 0 to 0.3 
 
Total Population 0 to 0.2 0 to 0.2 
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Table 3.  
Elasticities for Men and Single Women 
 
Study 
Estimated 
Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
       Panel A: Income Elasticity  
Bishop, Heim, and 
Mihaly (2009) 
-0.02 Single women ages 25-55 CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
Income elasticity 
from 2003 
Eklöf and Sacklén 
(2000)  
-0.02 Men ages 25-55, not self-
employed, disabled, or farmers 
PSID 1976 Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
  
Heim (2009a) 0 Married men ages 25-55, not 
retired, students, or disabled 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
  
Imbens, Rubin, and 
Sacerdote (2001) 
-0.05 to -0.11 Massachusetts Megabucks 
lottery participants 
Survey of MA 
Megabucks lottery 
participants matched to 
Social Security earnings 
1984-
1988 
Lottery prize 
amount 
Elasticity of 
earnings with 
respect to lottery 
prize amount 
Jacob and Ludwig 
(2012) 
-0.09 Applicants to Chicago Housing 
Voucher Program in 1997, under 
age 65, not disabled, and living 
in private housing 
Unemployment 
insurance data 
1990-
2005 
Random assignment 
of treatment 
(voucher receipt) 
and control (no 
voucher) groups 
Includes some 
married women; 
point estimate 
       Panel B: Substitution Elasticity 
Bishop, Heim, and 
Mihaly (2009) 
0.19 Single women ages 25-55 CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
Substitution 
elasticity from 2003 
Eklöf and Sacklén 
(2000)  
0.27 Men ages 25-55, not self-
employed, disabled, or farmers 
PSID 1976 Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
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Table 3.  
Continued. 
       
Study 
Estimated 
Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
Heim (2009a) 0.04 to 0.07 Married men ages 25-55, not 
retired, students, or disabled 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
  
Jacob and Ludwig 
(2012) 
0.15 Applicants to Chicago Housing 
Voucher Program in 1997, under 
age 65, not disabled, and living 
in private housing 
Unemployment 
insurance data 
1990-
2005 
Random assignment 
of treatment 
(voucher receipt) 
and control (no 
voucher) groups 
Includes some 
married women; 
point estimate 
Keane (2011) 0.05 to 0.84 Men Literature review of 
static models 
      
       Panel C: Hours Elasticity  
Bishop, Heim, and 
Mihaly (2009) 
-0.03 
(substitution) 
-0.02 
(income) 
Single women ages 25-55 CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
Substitution 
elasticity from 2003 
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Table 3.  
Continued. 
       
Study 
Estimated 
Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
Chetty (2012) 0.33 Meta-analysis of 5 labor supply 
and 10 taxable income elasticity 
studies 
      Elasticity would be 
0.08 if restricted to 
U.S. studies, 0.15 if 
restricted to U.S. 
studies on hours 
elasticity or 0.06 if 
restricted to U.S. 
studies on broad 
income elasticity 
using same method 
described in paper; 
estimated elasticity 
is the compensated 
elasticity; taxable 
income elasticities 
include elasticities 
of earned income 
Heim (2009a) 0.04 to 0.07 Married men ages 25-55, not 
retired, students, or disabled 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
  
Ziliak and Kniesner 
(1999) 
0.13 Continuously married and 
working men ages 22-60 
PSID 1978-
1987 
Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
 
Ziliak and Kniesner 
(2005) 
-0.47 Men ages 25-60 PSID 1980-
1999 
Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
Allow consumption 
and leisure to be 
non-separable 
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Table 3.  
Continued. 
 
Study 
Estimated 
Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
       
Panel D: Participation Elasticity 
Bishop, Heim, and 
Mihaly (2009) 
0.22 
(substitution) 
0 (income) 
Single women ages 25-55 CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
Substitution 
elasticity from 2003 
Chetty (2012) 0.25 Average among labor supply 
studies estimating participation 
elasticities 
Literature review   Average would be 
0.24 if restricted to 
U.S. studies; 
includes studies of 
married women 
Heim (2009a) 0 Married men ages 25-55, not 
retired, students, or disabled 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
 
Juhn, Murphy, and 
Topel (2002) 
0.05 to 0.29, 
weighted 
average of 
0.13 
Working-age men March CPS 1972-
1973 and 
1988-
1989 
Change in 
participation rate 
from cross-sectional 
wage variation 
  
Note: CPS=Current Population Survey; PSID=Panel Study of Income Dynamics.   
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Table 4.  
Elasticities for Married Women   
Study Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
 
Panel A: Income Elasticity 
Blau and Kahn 
(2007) 
-0.1 to -0.14 Married women ages 25-54 with 
spouse ages 25-54 
March CPS 1999-
2001 
Net-of-tax wage 
rate 
  
Heim (2007) -0.05 
(participation)     
-0.02 (hours) 
Married women ages 25-55, not 
self-employed, retired, disabled, 
or students 
March CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
Elasticity estimates 
for 2002; 
population-
weighted 
Jacob and Ludwig 
(2012) 
-0.09 Applicants to Chicago Housing 
Voucher Program in 1997, under 
age 65, not disabled, and living 
in private housing 
Unemployment 
insurance data 
1990-
2005 
Random assignment 
of treatment 
(voucher receipt) 
and control (no 
voucher) groups 
Includes some men 
and single women; 
point estimate 
Kumar (2009) -0.4 to -0.7 Married women ages 25-60, not 
self-employed, not in SEO 
subsample 
PSID 1985 and 
1989 
1986 tax reform   
       
Panel B: Substitution Elasticity   
Blau and Kahn 
(2007) 
0.33 to 0.38 Married women ages 25-54 with spouse 
ages 25-54 
March CPS 1999-
2001 
Net-of-tax wage 
rate 
Population-
weighted estimates 
Heim (2007) 0.03 
(participation) 
0.14 (hours) 
Married women ages 25-55, not self-
employed, retired, disabled, or students 
March CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
Elasticity estimates 
for 2002; 
population-
weighted 
Heim (2009a) 0.25 to 0.34 Married women with husband ages 25-
55, not retired, disabled, student, or 
working more than 4,000 hours a year 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
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Table 4.  
Continued. 
    
 
  
Study Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
Jacob and Ludwig 
(2012) 
0.15 Applicants to Chicago Housing Voucher 
Program in 1997, under age 65, not 
disabled, and living in private housing 
Unemployment 
insurance data 
1990-
2005 
Random assignment 
of treatment 
(voucher receipt) 
and control (no 
voucher) groups 
Includes some men 
and single women; 
point estimate 
Kumar (2009) 0.3 to 0.7 Married women ages 25-60, not self-
employed, not in Survey of Economic 
Opportunity subsample 
PSID 1985 and 
1989 
1986 tax reform   
              
Panel C: Hours Elasticity 
Blau and Kahn 
(2007) 
0.10 to 0.12 Married women ages 25-54 with spouse 
ages 25-54 
March CPS 1999-
2001 
Cross-sectional 
wage variation 
  
Heim (2007) 0.14 
(substitution)  
-0.02 (income) 
Married women ages 25-55, not self-
employed, retired, disabled, or students 
March CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
Elasticity estimates 
for 2002; 
population-
weighted 
Heim (2009a) 0.24 to 0.33 
(substitution) 
Married women with husband ages 25-
55, not retired, disabled, student, or 
working more than 4,000 hours a year 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
  
              
Panel D: Participation Elasticity 
Blau and Kahn 
(2007) 
0.27 to 0.29 Married women ages 25-54 with spouse 
ages 25-54 
March CPS 1999-
2001 
Cross-sectional 
wage variation 
  
Heim (2007) 0.03 
(substitution)  
-0.05 (income) 
Married women ages 25-55, not self-
employed, retired, disabled, or students 
March CPS 1979-
2003 
Cross-sectional 
variation in wages 
Elasticity estimates 
for 2002; 
population-
weighted 
Heim (2009a) 0.07 to 0.17 
(substitution) 
Married women with husband ages 25-
55, not retired, disabled, student, or 
working more than 4,000 hours a year 
PSID 2000 Cross-sectional 
variation in after-tax 
wages 
  
Note: CPS=Current Population Survey; PSID=Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
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Table 5.  
Elasticity of Broad Income 
       
Study Elasticity  Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
Auten and Carroll 
(1999) 
0.57 Single and joint filers with no 
change in filing status ages 25-
55 in 1985; incomes above 
$21,020 for joint filers and 
$15,610 for single filers in 1985; 
not on alternative minimum tax 
SOI panel (stratified 
random sample of tax 
filers) 
1985 and 
1989 
Change in gross 
income and net-of-
tax rate from 1985 
to 1989 from Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 
Elasticity of gross 
income with 
respect to net-of-
tax rate 
Chetty (2012) 0.33 Meta-analysis of five labor 
supply and 10 taxable income 
elasticity studies 
      Elasticity would be 
0.08 if restricted to 
U.S. studies, 0.15 if 
restricted to U.S. 
studies on hours 
elasticity, or 0.06 if 
restricted to U.S. 
studies on broad 
income elasticity 
using same method 
described in paper; 
estimated elasticity 
is the compensated 
elasticity; taxable 
income elasticities 
include elasticities 
of earned income 
Giertz (2007) 0.15 to 
0.23 
Filers with broad income above 
$10,000 in year one and positive 
income in future year; married 
and single filers who did not 
change filing status 
SOI panel (stratified 
random sample of tax 
filers) 
1979-
2001 
Changes in net-of-
tax rate over time 
Elasticity weighted 
by income; change 
in broad income 
and net-of-tax rate 
over three years 
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Table 5.  
Continued. 
          
Study Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
Giertz (2010) 0 to 0.1 
(short 
term) 
0.19 to 
0.30 (long 
term) 
Filed every year between 1989 
and 1995 and taxable income 
above $10,000; married and 
single filers who did not change 
filing status 
SOI panel 1988-
1995 
Changes in net-of-
tax rate over time 
Elasticity weighted 
by income 
Goolsbee (2000) 1.3 in short 
run 
 -0.17 to 
0.4 in long 
run 
Highest paid five employees of 
companies in Standard and 
Poor's S&P 500, S&P Midcap 
400, and S&P Small Cap 600 in 
firms whose fiscal years end in 
December; individual observed 
at least four times 
Execucomp 1991-
1995 
Change in net-of-
tax-rate from 1993 
tax act 
Elasticity of broad 
income with 
respect to net-of-
tax rate 
Gruber and Saez (2002) 0.07 to 
0.12 
-0.07 
income 
effect 
Married and single filers without 
change in marital status; income 
above $10,000 in year one 
CWHS (panel of tax 
returns from selecting 
certain four-digit 
endings of the primary 
taxpayer's Social 
Security number) 
1979-
1990 
Change in net-of-tax 
rate over three-year 
period 
Elasticity weighted 
by income; change 
in broad income 
and net-of-tax rate 
over three years; 
estimates vary 
depending on 
income controls 
used 
Heim (2009b) 0.18 to 0.2 Filers over age 25 without 
change in filing status and gross 
income above $10,000 in 2000 
Edited Panel of Tax 
Returns (CWHS + high-
income sample from 
1999) 
1995-
2004 
Change in net-of-tax 
rate over three-year 
period 
  
Imbens, Rubin, and 
Sacerdote (2001) 
-0.05 
to -0.11 
(income 
elasticity) 
Massachusetts Megabucks 
lottery participants 
Survey of MA 
Megabucks lottery 
participants matched to 
Social Security earnings 
1984-
1988 
Lottery prize 
amount 
Elasticity of 
earnings with 
respect to lottery 
prize amount 
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Table 5.  
Continued. 
       
Study Elasticity Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
Kopczuk (2005) 0.01 to 
0.31 
Married filers; includes only 
filers without age exemption; 
no change in marital status; no 
head of household 
SOI/University of 
Michigan tax panel 
1979-
1990 
Changes in net-of-
tax rate over three-
year period (1980, 
1986 tax reform) 
Estimates for single 
filers less reliable; 
change in broad 
income and net-of-
tax rate over three 
years; estimates 
vary across income 
groups; estimates 
unweighted 
Saez (2003) 0.08 Single and married filers who do 
not change marital status and 
who are on regular tax schedule 
in year one 
University of Michigan 
tax panel 
1979-
1981 
Changes in net-of-
tax rate over 
consecutive years 
-0.44 for high 
income, 0.12 for 
middle income; 
estimates 
unweighted 
Note: SOI=Statistics of Income, CWHS=Continuous Work History Sample. 
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Table 6.  
Elasticity by Income 
       
Study Elasticity  Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
      
Panel A: High-Income Taxpayers 
     Goolsbee (2000) 1.3 in short 
run, -0.17 
to 0.4 in 
long run 
Highest paid five employees of 
companies in Standard and 
Poor's S&P 500, S&P Midcap 
400, and S&P Small Cap 600 in 
firms whose fiscal years end in 
December; individual observed 
at least four times 
Execucomp 1991-
1995 
Change in net-of-
tax-rate from 1993 
tax act 
Elasticity of broad 
income with 
respect to net-of-
tax rate 
Heim (2009b) 0.67 to 
0.90 
Filers over age 25 without 
change in filing status and gross 
income above $500,000 in 2000 
Edited Panel of Tax 
Returns (CWHS + high-
income sample from 
1999) 
1995-
2004 
Change in net-of-tax 
rate over three-year 
period 
  
Saez (2004) 0.2  Stratified sample of tax 
returns oversampled for 
high-income taxpayers 
1960-
2000 
-0.04 for bottom 99 
percent, 0.5 for top 
1 percent 
Elasticity of gross 
income net of 
capital gains and 
taxable Social 
Security and 
unemployment 
insurance benefits 
with respect to 
net-of-tax rate  
Showalter and 
Thurston (1997) 
0.33 Male physicians under age 60 
with income above $80,000 in 
1983 who are self-employed 
Survey data from 
American Medical 
Association Master File 
of Physicians 
1983-
1987 
Change in net-of-tax 
rate from 1986 tax 
reform and state tax 
variation 
Elasticity of hours 
with respect to 
net-of-tax rate 
among workers 
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Table 6.  
Continued. 
          
Study Elasticity  Sample Data Source 
Time 
Period Variation Notes 
      
Panel B: Low-Income Taxpayers 
     Eissa and Hoynes 
(2004) 
0.03 Married men ages 25-54 with 
children and wife with less than 
12 years of schooling 
March CPS 1984-
1996 
Change in after-tax 
income from EITC 
expansions 
Elasticity of labor 
force participation 
with respect to 
after-tax income 
Eissa and Hoynes 
(2004) 
0.27 Married women ages 25-54 with 
less than 12 years of schooling, 
with children 
March CPS 1984-
1996 
Change in after-tax 
income from EITC 
expansions 
Elasticity of labor 
force participation 
with respect to 
after-tax income 
Hotz and Scholz (2003) 0.69 to 
1.16 
Single women with children Literature review   Change in after-tax 
income from EITC 
expansions 
  
Meyer and Rosenbaum 
(2001) 
0.43 Single mothers ages 19-44 March CPS 1984-
1996 
Changes in after-tax 
wage from EITC 
expansions and 
means-tested 
transfers 
Elasticity of labor 
force participation 
with respect to 
after-tax income 
Note: CWHS=Continuous Work History Sample; CPS=Current Population Survey; EITC=earned income tax credit. 
 
